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Abstract 
Does regional decentralization threaten the commitment to regional equality in government 
outcomes? We attempt to shed light on this question by drawing on unique evidence from 
the largest European unitary states to have engaged in countrywide health system 
decentralization: Italy and Spain. We estimate, decompose, and run counterfactual analysis of 
regional inequality in government output (health expenditure per capita) and outcome 
(health system satisfaction) during the expansion of health care decentralization in both 
countries. We find no evidence of an increase in regional inequalities in outcomes and 
outputs in the examined period. Inequalities are accounted for by differences in health system 
design. 
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Regional Health Care Decentralization in 
Unitary States: Equal Spending, Equal 
Satisfaction? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Reforms involving the territorial reorganization of public services have become 
common over the past few decades across most European countries (Council of 
European Municipalities and Regions, 2013). Of all public policy responsibilities, the 
delivery of health care exhibits the most drastic power re-allocation to sub-national 
governments in European unitary states (Costa-Font and Greer, 2012) 1 . The 
motivation mostly lies in the need for government to be accountable to citizens with 
heterogeneous needs and preferences (Oates, 1972). However, it is possible to 
identify other motivations alongside wider economic objectives (e.g., Weingast, 
2009).  
 
Nonetheless, the decentralisation of publicly subsidized services such as health care 
raises the concern that it might exacerbate disparities in public sector activity. That 
said, many do not question that uniformly run services might generate important 
regional disparities too, which might be of an even larger magnitude. In the health 
care sector, regional disparities in health care activity may result from differences in 
the clinical practices of physicians working in a specific location as well as intended 
regulations and organisational structures (Skinner and Fisher, 1997). In contrast, as 
we explain below in section two, a decentralised health system might have the 
                                                 
1 This movement may be counterproductive if health care delivery has large economies of scale and 
uniform needs and preferences. However, both limited-scale economies and heterogeneity in needs and 
preferences offer scope for welfare improvements from a tighter organization of authority and 
preferences. 
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instruments to incentivise equity formally (equalisation grants), or informally (policy 
transfer and diffusion). In a manner similar to that of federal states, unitary states 
engaging in health care decentralization limit the responsibility of regional 
governments by setting centrally defined framework regulation2. Indeed, regional 
funding comes only from both state level taxes but federal set block transfers, which 
include equalization grants (to correct for initial regional disadvantages), and only 
partially from transferred taxes (e.g., in both Spain and Italy, health care is the main 
policy responsibility of regional governments and accounts for almost half of the 
total regional budgets). 
 
Existing literature examining the effect of decentralization on regional inequalities is 
ambiguous. Giannoni and Hitris (2002) find evidence that decentralization has 
increased the diversity of regional expenditure per capita in Italy. In contrast, Zhong 
(2010) concludes that regional decentralization in Canada has reduced inter-
provincial inequalities while it has increased intra-regional differences in utilization. 
Similarly, studies examining health care activity (Quadrado et al., 2001) and outputs 
and outcomes (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006) find a reduction of regional inequalities 
following the first wave of regional devolution in Spain. Hence, it is an empirical 
question whether a territorially decentralized provision of public services aggravates 
pre-existing regional inequalities. This is a critical question in the territorial design of 
public services, and is particularly important in unitary states where long-lasting 
disparities are deemed to be defeating the mission of a national health service (‘equal 
service for equal need’). However, limited empirical evidence has been gathered on 
this subject. Most of the evidence is based on single-country analysis, and thus, the 
role played by country-specific institutional settings remains unclear. The present 
paper attempts to contribute to the literature in several ways. 
                                                 
2 By ‘federal state’ we refer here to the constitutional definition of the state rather than the actual political 
and fiscal dynamics of the countries under study. Both Italy and Spain share some of the classical features 
of federal states.  
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First, we examine the patterns of regional inequalities in the two largest European 
unitary states that have decentralized the health system throughout their territory, 
namely Italy and Spain. Evidence on the effect of decentralisation on regional 
equality to date refers to one country alone. The advantage of drawing from data 
from more than one country is that it allows for cross-country counterfactual 
analysis and improves the generalizability and the external validity of the results.  
 
Second, we specifically take advantage of the fact that the original decentralization 
design has been subject to two comparable processes of reform.3 Indeed, both Italy 
and Spain4 are unitary states exhibiting similar institutional designs (e.g., tax-funded 
health care, similar decentralization and number of regional units, framework laws, 
unitary state structures, and funding equalization mechanisms).Our empirical 
strategy follows a before-and-after methodology to examine the prevailing 
longitudinal regional inequality patterns in outputs and outcomes in both Italian 
and Spanish regions from 1998 to 2009. That is, five years before and seven years 
after the second decentralization wave.  
 
Third, given that government decentralization can influence both the way users 
access health care and several dimensions of quality of care and output, but not 
necessarily health outcomes directly (e.g., mortality), we concentrate on examining 
the effect on outputs ( using unadjusted per capita spending) and a health care 
process related dimension of quality sensitive to health policy reform .5 We control 
for regional differences in fiscal capacity (proxied by income per capita at the 
regional level) and health care needs (measured by the share of people over 65 years 
                                                 
3 Both Italy and Spain have gone through two specific waves of decentralization: a first wave around 1980 
(1978 in Italy, and 1981 in Spain), and the second wave two decades later around 2000 (1999 in Italy, 
and 2002 in Spain). 
4 In the United Kingdom (at the time of the study), devolution has only affected Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland, while England has remained centrally managed. In contrast, Italy and Spain exhibited a 
countrywide devolution in the second wave examined here.  
5 The effects of such processes can be captured in an overall health system satisfaction evaluation that is 
sensitive to changes in service quality in advanced economies (Blendon et al., 1990; Footman et al., 2013). 
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of age). Finally, the paper contributes by employing a set of outcome and empirical 
strategies that extends previous research. 
 
One outstanding question is whether territorial decentralization is actually driving 
patterns of regional inequalities in comparison with other potential drivers. To 
attempt to shed some light to such question, we consider a number of tests on 
standard inequality indices and we perform a regression-based (Oaxaca–Blinder) 
decomposition analysis to understand how much the observed inequality can be 
explained by decentralization alone. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the 
institutional background of the two examined countries. Section 3 describes the data 
used and the empirical strategy. Section 4 sets out the results, and Section 5 
discusses conclusions. 
 
 
2. Background  
 
2.1. Decentralization and regional inequalities in government activity 
 
Decentralization (also called devolution) as we refer to here entails the re-allocation 
of central government responsibilities to sub-central institutions; typically, it implies 
the re-assignment of regional or local autonomy. The main mechanism through 
which decentralization can influence governance is by strengthening political and 
fiscal accountability. Thus, to study the mechanisms through which decentralization 
can influence regional inequalities in government activity, political and fiscal 
accountability need to be examined together.  
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Political accountability, in the form of regional autonomy, is deemed to increase the 
probability of health reforms (Chernichovsky, 1995), government spending, and 
redistribution (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2011). However, such autonomy is 
usually exercised within the limits imposed by framework legislation, naturally 
limiting potential diversity in public service provision in federal states. On the other 
hand, if regional autonomy is reflected in regional-specific needs and preferences, 
the spatial distribution of resources should mirror such preferences, which would 
increase diversity in outputs.6 Nonetheless, even without the framework law limits 
to diversity, diversity can be reduced if there are inceptives for policy transfer. 
Hence, the overall longer term effects on inequalities over time are ambiguous 
(Besley and Kudamatsi, 2006; Kang et al., 2012). 
 
From a fiscal standpoint, decentralizing funding (e.g., tax base and rate), even if only 
refer to handful of taxes, should alter the balance between political and funding 
responsibility, and hence expand fiscal accountability. This would activate 
constituents’ incentives to ‘vote-with-their-feet’ (Oates, 1972), and to strengthen their 
control on government activity (so-called ‘political agency’). Both, ought to improve 
governance and reduce undesired disparities (Breton, 1996; Weingast, 2009). In 
contrast, if decentralization fails to produce the political incentives to improve public 
services in some regions, and fails to engage people in regional mobility, then one 
would observe an expansion of differences across regions.  
 
Another explanation for the emergence of spatial differences lies in the effects of 
differences in economic development, which may limit the potential for fiscal 
accountability effects to be fully exercised. Decentralization is likely to benefit 
regions that already have a higher fiscal base from which to extract government 
                                                 
6 Sen (1999) notes that no famines occur in countries where there are regular elections and a free press. 
Epidemiological research into the social determinants of health indicates that being subordinate to 
authority can have detrimental effects on mental and physical health (Marmot, 2004). 
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resources. This would be expected to exacerbate disparities across regional health 
services. For example, in the context of the United States, Skinner and Fisher (1997) 
argue that a federally (centrally) organized Medicare leads to wide disparities in 
medical spending per capita, which persist after adjusting by age, gender, price, and 
illness-related factors. In other words, an increasing efficiency of some states in 
delivering health care may come at the expense of higher disparities in health 
outcomes.  
 
One potential limit to an expansion of spatial inequalities is the role of equalization 
grants to correct for differences in initial disposable resources, but this is not without 
controversy. Recently, Kessler et al. (2011) challenged this view by drawing on the 
logic of a policy innovation and diffusion paradigm. They suggest that equalization 
grants in a federation give rise to interregional income inequalities that could not 
persist otherwise because of migration. In addition, they show that, although 
equalization grants in federal countries can actually contribute to equalize resources, 
equality of resources does not necessarily lead to equality of services if the quality of 
local governments (and their efficiency in providing the services) is heterogeneous 
across a country. This may be defined as the ‘equalization grants paradox’ in 
interregional transfer payments. Hence, whether the latter takes place or not is an 
empirical question.  
 
A subtler explanation for the emergence of inequalities across regions is the 
existence of spatial interdependence. If decentralisation brings transparency (Beland 
and Lacours, 2010), then some regional health services are likely to innovate by 
adopting successful policies, but it takes some time, and possibly political incentives, 
for the remaining regions to emulate the frontrunner. If an institutional design 
allows for some competition across jurisdictions, a common standard may be 
reached informally, which would reduce regional differences. This would be 
reinforced by the presence of laws imposing minimum common standards across 
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jurisdictions. Some empirical literature challenges this view by considering different 
cross-country measures of equality and different countries (e.g., in terms of income: 
Costa-Font and Rico, 2006; Costa-Font, 2010; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010; 
Sorens, 2014). 
 
Finally, a final explanation for the development of regional inequalities in 
government activity may be that decentralization implies a loss of political influence 
for poorer regions in the allocation of federal funds, resulting in fewer resources 
being available at the local level. Whether this is the case or not depends on the 
political dynamics of each country, as well as the population of relatively poorer 
regions which explain some central-level resistance to further decentralization. If 
certain (poorer) regions were already well represented in central-level institutions, 
then decentralization by scattering decision-making power may weaken the leverage 
of those regions that would as a result experience a loss of influence. 
 
One limitation of the existing literature is that evidence on the spatial effects of 
health care decentralization is mostly limited to single-country analysis and thus has 
limited external validity. The present paper attempts to overcome this type of 
limitation by extending the analysis to two comparable country experiences of 
health care decentralization, as described in the next section. 
 
2.2. Decentralized unitary states: Italy and Spain 
 
The institutional default in Italy and Spain is comparable. Both countries are unitary 
states, and thus the authority that the regions hold comes directly from the central 
state. Italy has been a unitary state since 1861, but region states have existed since 
only 1970. Similarly, Spain has been a unitary state, with only two republican 
periods in 1873 and 1931, during which attempts were made to create a federal and 
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regional state, respectively. However, unlike in the United Kingdom, devolution in 
Italy and Spain did not follow a ‘historic nation’ approach to create ‘federacies’, and 
instead was inspired by a ‘system of regions’ model whereby all regions were 
required to be responsible for health care. Perhaps the main difference between Italy 
and Spain is the initial asymmetries of Spanish decentralization until 2002 where 
health care responsibilities were transferred to all autonomous communities.7 The 
exceptions are Navarra and the Basque Country in Spain,8 which have special fiscal 
status, and the special status of some Italian regions. Both countries have undertaken 
a comparable regional decentralization process where autonomy is limited by 
framework legislation. 
 
In both countries, basic social services such as health care are tax funded with an 
explicit commitment to delivering health system equality in their health care 
legislation. The regional allocation of resources is in both countries based on 
comparable resource allocation formulas, which include equalization grants. 9 
Funding comes from resources collected regionally (either from transferred taxes or 
participation in state-wide taxes) and block transfers from the central government, 
including equalization grants based generally on population and other criteria 
(including fiscal capacity, meaning that more funds from the central government are 
directed toward poorer communities). General taxes were (and still are) collected by 
the central state and transferred to the regions using unadjusted block grants.  
                                                 
7 The first wave began with the transfer of health care responsibilities to Catalonia (completed in 1981), 
followed by Andalucia (1984), the Basque Country and Valencia (1988), Galicia and Navarra (1991), and 
ended with the transfer of health care responsibilities to the Canary Islands (1994). A second wave 
followed that bridged the gap between the regions with health care responsibilities, and the 10 remaining 
regions were invested with the same level of health care responsibilities in 2002. 
8 For example, article 117 of the Italian Constitution assigns to the Central State the exclusive right to only 
‘define the Essential Levels of Services linked to civil and social rights to be guaranteed in the whole 
country’. Health care services are of course included, so that only the central government can identify the 
mandatory level of care to be assured in all regions, and it has the exclusive right to define the framework 
legislation. 
9 Navarra and the Basque Country are two special regions with a specific funding system and have 
managed to claim their historical fiscal self-government rights. Unlike the other region states of Spain, 
they collect their taxes and transfer to the central government the estimated costs of centrally provided 
public services, with little contribution to the overall country redistribution. 
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Figure 1. Share of central government revenue out of total general government revenue 
(1998-2009) 
 
 
 
 
Both Italy and Spain increased not only the degree of fiscal self-government after 
2001–2002, but the extent of political accountability as well. In Italy, from 1993 to 
1997, the fiscal decentralization process received a boost with the attribution to 
regional governments of contributions for the National Health Service. However, it 
was only from 1998 onwards that a regional tax on productive activities (IRAP) was 
created together with a regional surcharge.  After constitutional reform in 2001, Italy 
established framework legislation to ensure that ‘essential levels of care’ were linked 
to central government. Similarly, in Spain, further fiscal accountability in 1992 
introduced regional participation in income tax (15%), which by 2002 amounted to 
33% of income tax and 40% of value added tax, although with a highly restricted 
capacity to raise the tax base and tax rate. These trends are clear from Figure 1 and 2, 
representing the evolution of the share of central government revenue (expenditure, 
respectively) out of general government revenue (expenditure) in both Italy and 
Spain. Data are taken from the OECD Fiscal Decentralization Database and are 
commonly used indicators in the literature (e.g., Sacchi and Salotti, 2016); they 
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clearly show decreasing trends, an evidence supporting the consolidation of the 
decentralization process in both countries. 
 
Figure 2. Share of central government expenditure out of total general government 
expenditure (1998-2009) 
 
 
 
Of all the policies that have been devolved, health care is the most comparable 
policy between countries and has the largest impact on the public budget. It 
represents about ¾ of the budget for Italian regions and 1/2 for Spanish ones. Health 
care is for the most part an undisputed regional-state responsibility in both Italy and 
Spain, and only a small number of policy responsibilities are left to the central states 
(e.g., drug price setting and international health). 
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3. Empirical strategy 
 
3.1. Rationalizing regional inequalities 
 
In this section, we examine the main hypothesis of the paper, namely whether 
government territorial decentralization influences regional inequalities and their 
potential triggers. Thus, we examine whether inequality in one dimension is related 
to inequality in a different (but interrelated) domain, based on the premise that 
resources are allocated (and equalized) by the central government, but are 
eventually spent and managed by regional governments. The starting point is to 
examine whether the equalization of funding – and thus of resources available to 
each regional government via equalization grants and own revenues following 
decentralization – necessarily implies equalization of output, considering that health 
care activity (OUTPUT) results from the use of health care inputs (RESOURCES). We 
can define a simple function for this as follows: 
 
OUTPUT=f(RESOURCES, Xf)                                             (1) 
 
where X is a set of controls that may affect how resources are translated into outputs 
by each regional government (we avoid additional subscripts for simplicity 
purposes). In turn, we also attempt to measure a simple relationship for the 
empirical question of whether output equalization implies equalization of outcomes 
as follows: 
 
OUTCOMES=g(OUTPUT, Xg)                                                     (2) 
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This relationship captures the idea that health care activity will produce some 
outcomes in dimensions that can be measured after a reasonable period of time. This 
is referred to below as the quality of services. 
 
Decentralization enters our empirical specification via resources and constraints for 
each local government: the amount of resources is conditioned by the equalization 
role played by central government, both before and after decentralization; the 
composition of resources in terms of own revenues versus transfers from the centre is 
affected both by the degree of fiscal decentralization and the availability of the tax 
base at the local level. However, the operationalization of our specified measures is 
as follows. First, we collected data for Italian and Spanish regions over the years 
1998–2009 from the Ministry of Health and the National Institute of Statistics of both 
countries. The period examined is, as explained in Section 2.2, one during which 
significant processes of reform took place, leading to the consolidation of fiscal 
decentralization in Italy and Spain (second wave of health care decentralization). We 
have examined subsamples of regions for Spain and Italy, but given the potential for 
interregional mobility, especially between neighbouring jurisdiction, and the lower 
precision when subsamples of small regions are examined, we do not to exclude any 
region from the analysis. This strategy produces conservative estimates as it would 
change inequality estimate upwards in the event of devolution increasing regional 
inequalities.  
 
Alongside a series of records on regional characteristics that may influence either 
outcomes or outputs, we focus on examining two main variables of interest: health 
care spending per capita (HEXP, which we consider as a proxy for outputs, 
according to Atkinson, 2005) and the quality of services (QUAL, the share of people 
very satisfied with medical care, which we take as a proxy for procedural outcomes). 
The strategy we follow here is aimed at measuring the variation in the degree of 
inequality in these two domains before and after the consolidation of 
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decentralization. We draw on a well-established empirical strategy based on the use 
of concentration indices and coefficients of variation to measure inequality and an 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition methodology to decompose its determinants and run 
counterfactual estimates. 
 
3.2. Evaluating regional inequalities 
 
To measure regional inequality in both countries, we begin by estimating the Gini 
concentration index. Specifically, we first rank regions according to their per capita 
GDP (a measure of fiscal capacity, and thus of a higher fiscal capacity following the 
consolidation of fiscal decentralization) and compute the Gini concentration index 
for both HEXP and QUAL, pooling all the years before decentralization and after 
decentralization, and then separately for the two sub-periods. We then test whether 
the Gini index is statistically significantly different from zero, to understand whether 
inequality is present and, if it is, to what degree in both domains. Following similar 
steps, we then compute the coefficients of variation for each year on both HEXP and 
QUAL and test whether average coefficients of variation are different before and 
after decentralization. We also consider for this exercise two additional variables as 
measures for fiscal capacity and needs. 
 
Finally, we better characterize the observed trends in inequality by considering an 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. Let =E(QUALa|X)-E(QUALb|X) be the difference in 
Regional Health Care Decentralization in Unitary States 
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conditional means of the outcome variable QUAL comparing before (b) and after (a) 
decentralization. Thus, =[E(Xa)ꞌa]-[E(Xb)ꞌb] can be decomposed as: 
 
            =[E(Xa)-E(Xb)]ꞌb +E(Xb)[a-b]+[E(Xa)-E(Xb)][a-b]                              (3) 
 
where the first of the three terms represents the differences in ‘endowments’ (X), 
namely the determinants of QUAL, mainly health care spending; the second term 
represents the differences in the coefficients (), namely the way in which health 
spending is transformed into outcome before and after decentralization; and the 
final term represents the interactions between the two differences, accounting for the 
fact that differences in both endowments and coefficients exist simultaneously 
before and after decentralization (e.g., Jann, 2008, for more technical details). We test 
two specifications: the first one includes in X the variable HEXP only; in the second 
one, we augment this baseline specification with the share of people over 65 years of 
age (OVER65, as a measure of greater health care needs), the per capita GDP (GDP, 
as a measure of fiscal capacity), and a dummy picking up the political alignment 
between regional and central government (ALIGNMENT), because this may 
influence the amount of available resources and spending (see, e.g., for the Italian 
case: Bordignon and Turati, 2009; Piacenza and Turati, 2014). 
 
As a further exercise, we also consider a counterfactual analysis, exploiting the 
differences in decentralization patterns between the two countries. The basic idea 
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behind this exercise is to understand whether the differences in outcomes between 
Italy and Spain are explained by observable characteristics (the ‘endowments’) or by 
coefficients (which maps how observed characteristics are translated into outcomes 
by regional governments in the two countries). Let =E(YSpa)-E(YIta)=[E(XSpa)ꞌSpa]-
[E(XIta)ꞌIta]; again, this can be decomposed as: 
 
                 =[E(XSpa)-E(XIta)]ꞌIta +E(XIta)[Spa-Ita]+[E(XSpa)-E(XIta)] [Spa-Ita]              (4) 
 
where the three terms are defined as before and allow us to attribute the difference 
in outcome to the difference in ‘endowments’ between the two countries (i.e., the 
observed characteristics of Italian and Spanish regions in terms of spending per 
capita, but also political alignment and fiscal capacity); the difference in the way 
resources are transformed into outcomes in the two countries (which will capture 
the institutional differences in the regional health care systems, including the quality 
of regional governments); and the residual interactions between these two terms. As 
before, we consider the simplest specification first, considering only HEXP in X, and 
then add further controls. 
 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for all the variables considered 
in the analysis. Average HEXP is approximately 500 euros higher in Italy than in 
Spain, although the difference in per capita income is approximately 3000 euros. The 
share of people over 65 years of age is also larger in Italy than in Spain by 
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approximately 2%, as is the share of people very satisfied with received medical 
care. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Preliminary analysis 
 
To begin with, we test the correlation between outcomes and outputs by regressing 
measures of (process-related) quality of services on health care spending per capita. 
A positive and significant correlation is found between the two variables: 0.004 for 
Spain (10% significance level) and 0.008 for Italy (1% significance level), indicating 
that, as expected, inequality in outputs may give rise to inequality in process-related 
outcomes. 
 
4.2. Inequality estimates 
 
Next, to test for the presence of regional inequalities, we first estimate the Gini 
concentration index, following the methodology described in, for example, 
O’Donnell et al. (2008), by ranking regions according to their per capita GDP. Table 1 
shows the Gini index for both health system satisfaction (QUAL) and unadjusted 
output (HEXP) for Spain (upper panel) and Italy (lower panel) for all the years, and 
separately for the sub-period 1998–2002(2001), which denotes before the ‘second 
decentralization wave’, and the sub-period 2003(2002)–2009, which denotes the post-
decentralization wave. 
 
Joan Costa-Font and Gilberto Turati  
              
17 
All the Gini coefficients are significantly different from zero except for the 
procedural outcome measure relating to the 1998–2002 period in Spain (the end of 
the first wave of health care decentralization). This exception can be explained by the 
fact that during this period a large number of policy innovations in some regions 
were extended to the rest of the country (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006). Thus, the 
results show no evidence of inequality in both dimensions. However, the patterns of 
these inequality indices indicate significant persistence across the two sub-periods, 
but are markedly different in both overall dimension estimates across both countries. 
Specifically, considering the whole period, Italian regions are slightly less unequal 
than Spanish ones in terms of spending. These estimates include Italian autonomous 
regions and all the Spanish regions (i.e., Navarra and the Basque Country) that hold 
higher fiscal accountability than the rest. Given that these regions are relatively 
affluent; they have more resources to invest in health care. However, in both 
countries, after the consolidation of decentralization at the beginning of the 2000s, 
we observe the same level of inequality, which is suggestive of a decline in regional 
inequalities in output after devolution, consistent with the findings of Costa-Font 
and Rico (2006).  
 
Table 1. Inequality in resources and outcomes (Gini index) 
Spain 
 
All yrs. 1998-2002 2003-2009 
Quality (‘Health system satisfaction’) 
 
0.034* 0.019 
 
0.062** 
  
[0.018] [0.029] 
 
[0.023] 
Output (‘Public spending per capita’) 
 
0.093*** 0.031*** 
 
0.026*** 
  
[0.009] [0.008] 
 
[0.009] 
Italy 
 
All yrs. 1998-2001 2002-2009 
Quality (‘Health system satisfaction’) 
 
0.147*** 0.146*** 
 
0.157*** 
  
[0.009] [0.015] 
 
[0.012] 
Output (‘Public spending per capita’) 
 
0.057*** 0.047*** 
 
0.028*** 
  
[0.006] [0.007] 
 
[0.005] 
Note: This table reports the Gini index of health systems satisfaction (Quality) and unadjusted 
output (spending per capita) across regions in Spain (upper panel) and Italy (lower panel) for 
the whole period examined 1998-2009 in column one. Columns two and three provide the Gini 
for the subperiods 1998-2002(2001) which refer to before as the ‘second decentralization 
wave’ and the period 2003(2002)-2009 which refer to post decentralization wave. SE in square 
brackets. Sig. lev.: *** 1%, **5%, * 10%.  
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Nonetheless, when we turn to examining inequalities in outcomes, we find 
inequalities in process-related outcomes (health system satisfaction) to be not 
significantly affected by devolution for Italy, while Table 1 reveals some differences 
across Spanish regions only after 2002. Thus, different patterns are observed across 
the two countries with respect to inequality in the two domains (i.e., outputs and 
outcomes) following the impact on resources stemming from decentralization. 
However, whether these patterns result from a decentralization design is a question 
that we examine further below.  
 
Table 2. Trends in inequality 
 
Quality (satisfaction) 
 
Health Spending p.c. 
 
before after Diff 
 
before after diff 
Spain 0.468 0.456 -0.011* 
 
0.079 0.090 0.011*** 
   
(0.007) 
   
(0.002) 
Italy 0.339 0.344 0.005 
 
0.086 0.077 -0.009*** 
   
(0.005) 
   
(0.001) 
 
Fiscal capacity 
 
Needs 
 
before after Diff 
 
before after diff 
Spain 0.214 0.193 -0.021*** 
 
0.180 0.198 -0.018*** 
   
(0.0007) 
   
(0.0008) 
Italy 0.253 0.248 -0.006*** 
 
0.168 0.134 0.034*** 
   
(0.0006) 
   
(0.001) 
Note: This table reports the means of the coefficient of variation in the period before 
decentralization (1998-2002(2001)) and in the period after (2002(2003)-2009), together with 
the t-test for the difference in means. We measure four different variables: health system 
satisfaction, health spending per capita, fiscal capacity proxied by GDP per capita and need 
proxied by population over 65. SE in parentheses. Sig. lev. t-test on diff.: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
To better understand the evolution in inequality, we compute coefficients of 
variation for the two countries in each year on the two domains (quality and 
spending). The advantage of the coefficient of variation is that it is a simple way to 
compare datasets with different means and particularly suited to our study. Figure 3 
shows the evolution of the two coefficients for all the examined years. We formally 
test whether mean values of coefficients of variation are different before/after 
decentralization with a standard t-test. The upper panel of Table 2 shows the results, 
Joan Costa-Font and Gilberto Turati  
              
19 
which confirm the different patterns discussed above. As in Spain, inequality in 
quality decreased (t-test significant at the 10% level), despite an increase in 
inequality in spending (t-test significant at the 1% level) experienced in the first 
years after devolution (in particular in 2007), but it actually declined over time. Thus, 
decentralization decreased inequality in outcomes, despite increasing – at least in the 
short run – differences in spending. In the case of Italy, inequality in spending 
actually decreased after decentralization (t-test significant at the 1% level), but 
inequality in quality did not vary significantly; thus, decentralization reduced 
differences in spending, but not in outcomes. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of coefficient of variation for quality and health spending 
 
 
We also extend the analysis of the trends in inequality to two additional domains, 
namely fiscal capacity (proxied by per capita GDP) and needs (proxied by the share 
of people over 65 years of age). The lower panel of Table 2 shows these results. After 
decentralization, both countries experienced a decrease in inequality in fiscal 
capacities (t-test significant at the 1% level in both countries), which was larger for 
Spanish regions; thus, convergence has been more rapid for Spanish regions in terms 
of per capita GDP. In contrast, we find two divergent patterns of inequality in needs, 
which increase in Italy and decrease in Spain: Italian regions are becoming more 
diverse in terms of needs, but this is not greatly reflected in the divergence of 
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spending per capita. The opposite occurs for Spanish regions. Figure 3 reproduces 
this evidence and shows similar long-term patterns for both the coefficient of 
variation of health expenditure and health system satisfaction, despite year-specific 
deviation such as in 2005. 
 
4.3. Inequality decompositions 
 
However, one potential concern is that patterns of inequality may not necessarily 
result from the expected mechanisms. To further understand the effect of these 
different mechanisms, we take advantage of a standard Oaxaca–Blinder 
decomposition methodology, which allows us to attribute the difference in QUAL to 
three different components: the determinants of the procedural outcome, the way in 
which these determinants map in the outcome before and after decentralization, and 
the interactions between the two differences (e.g., O’Donnell et al., 2008).  
 
Table 3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Y: quality) 
Variables Italy Spain 
 
I II I II 
Yb 35.93*** 35.93*** 24.15*** 24.52*** 
 
(1.354) (1.361) (0.998) (1.242) 
Ya 36.66*** 36.23*** 24.40*** 24.40*** 
 
(1.001) (1.183) (1.012) (1.021) 
Difference Yb-Ya -0.726 -0.292 -0.255 0.111 
 
(1.684) (1.804) (1.421) (1.607) 
Endowments -8.227*** -6.532*** -5.544** -5.121** 
 
(2.395) (2.295) (2.460) (2.203) 
Coefficients 13.64*** 3.681 10.83** 3.715 
 
(4.375) (2.934) (4.294) (5.733) 
Interaction -6.136 2.559 -5.541 1.517 
 
(4.718) (3.269) (4.747) (5.927) 
Observations 240 200 238 204 
Note: This table reports an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the conditional means of quality 
(health system satisfaction) before and after decentralisation. Col. I: controls include only 
spending per capita. Col. II: controls include spending per capita, GDP pc, share people over65, 
alignment. SE in parentheses. Sig. lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 shows the estimates relative to the two model specifications discussed in 
Section 3.2 for both countries: column I assumes only HEXP in the set of 
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determinants; whereas column II expands the set of controls by adding fiscal 
capacity (GDP), need (OVER65), and ALIGNMENT. Overall, the results are 
consistent across the two specifications: coherently with the earlier findings (Table 
2), differences in QUAL are not statistically significant. In contrast, differences in the 
determinants appear to be statistically significant and counterbalanced by 
differences in the coefficients (which are, however, significant only in the less rich 
specification). Average ‘endowments’ increased after decentralization, but 
coefficients  changed in the opposite direction, at least in the simplest specification. 
Thus, our results are consistent with the idea that the consolidation of federalism did 
appear to influence the way in which spending is actually transformed into the 
procedural outcome. 
 
4.4. Counterfactual exercise 
 
Finally, we run a counterfactual exercise, comparing Italy and Spain and explaining 
differences in outcomes across the two countries, again using an Oaxaca 
decomposition strategy. Table 4 shows the results, where columns I and II again 
denote the same two specifications discussed in Section 4.3. Importantly, these 
results appear to be consistent across specifications: differences in procedural 
outcomes (statistically significant across Italy and Spain) appear to be more 
explained by differences in the coefficients (namely the way in which Spanish and 
Italian regions transform outputs into outcomes) than by differences in the observed 
determinants of outcomes (from spending to fiscal capacity and needs). 
 
Overall, our results indicate some important differences across the countries in the 
evolution of regional inequalities that can be mainly explained, as expected, by 
differences in the institutional designs of the health systems. In particular, exploiting 
the different pattern of devolution across the two countries, also these results 
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indicate that government decentralization consistently did not increase regional 
inequality in outputs and outcomes. A crucial role is likely to be played by the 
quality of regional governments, captured here by the coefficients’ component of the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  
 
Table 4. Comparing Italy and Spain (Y: quality) 
Variables I II 
Yspa 24.28*** 24.45*** 
 
(0.708) (0.781) 
Yita 36.42*** 36.11*** 
 
(0.803) (0.889) 
Difference Yspa-Yita -12.14*** -11.66*** 
 
(1.070) (1.183) 
Endowments -4.114*** -1.333 
 
(1.296) (1.161) 
Coefficients -9.942*** -7.837*** 
 
(1.534) (1.358) 
Interaction 1.915 -2.488* 
 
(1.696) (1.398) 
Observations 478 404 
Note: This table reports an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the conditional means of quality 
for Italy compared to Spain. Col. I: controls include only spending per capita. Col. II: controls 
include spending per capita, GDP pc, share people over65, alignment. SE in parentheses. Sig. 
lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5. Conclusion   
 
Of all public services, health care has been the most decentralized across countries 
and thus is the most ideal to compare across countries. Specifically, many large 
European health care systems have progressively been re-allocating part of their 
political and fiscal authority to the regions. However, in unitary states, such reforms 
may pose some concerns insofar as they as perceived to dismantle the principles of 
equality on which they are based. Whether decentralization does expand regional 
inequalities in public sector activities is an empirical question and the main aim of 
this paper. 
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This paper has taken advantage of unique data from the experience of Italy and 
Spain of health care decentralization, to understand the effect of decentralized 
government on outputs and outcomes. Specifically, we have examined whether 
decentralization has led to regional imbalances in either health care activity or 
outcomes. To do this, we measured regional inequalities in outcomes and process-
related outcomes and employed a regression-based decomposition strategy to 
decompose them. 
 
The results provide us with unique evidence to evaluate the performance of regional 
decentralization. Italy and Spain are the two unique European countries to examine 
insofar as they exhibit comparable health care system designs and have devolved 
health care authority to their respective regions in a comparable fashion in the same 
period of time . Some other contextual factors are also comparable and common, 
except for historical legacies that are country-specific. We find no evidence that 
expansion of inequalities took place after decentralization on both health outcomes 
and resources available to the regions. This finding is consistent with evidence from 
Spain and Canada (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006; Costa-Font, 2010; Zhong, 2010). The 
inequality indices are different from zero, but when examining trends in inequalities 
in outcomes, we find a declining inequality after the consolidation and deepening of 
decentralization processes. Although inequality is found to be persistent before and 
after decentralization, inequality patterns are different across the countries. Italian 
regions are slightly less unequal than Spanish ones in terms of spending (even 
including autonomous regions). However, inequality indices have dropped in both 
countries and are found to be comparably similar (not statistically different in the 
second period examined). In contrast, Italian regions are more unequal in terms of 
(process) outcomes, and decentralization reduced differences in spending, but not in 
process-related outcomes. 
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Possible explanations for these limited regional inequalities include the development 
of framework laws and the role of equalization funds that limit the expansion of 
diversity of outputs. However, a more powerful explanation is based on the 
potential effect that decentralization exerts on incentives for policy innovation and 
diffusion. These incentives apply to both Italy and Spain, because some region states 
play the role of frontrunner in devising new programmes that are subsequently 
adopted in other regions. Thus, organizational advantages of some regions exert 
positive external effects on other regions. 
 
To conclude, from a policy standpoint, processes of health care decentralization in 
unitary states are unlikely to be a concern for regional cohesion in the context of 
European unitary states so long as the design promotes competition and policy 
innovation, and equalisation mechanisms and framework regulation do not exert 
unintended effects. The challenge lies in how to maintain a balance between 
incentivizing policy innovation and diffusion without hampering spatial cohesion, a 
challenge which call for a specific attention to the quality of governments. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
Spain 
Health Spending 
pc 238 991.74 313.78 485.50 1883.52 
Quality 238 24.28 10.90 4.80 58.69 
GDP pc 238 18309.81 5275.38 7614.00 31496.00 
SharePop65 204 17.89 3.40 11.04 24.60 
Alignment 204 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
Italy 
Health Spending 
pc 240 1488.13 306.66 876.00 2246.00 
Quality 240 36.42 12.41 13.82 66.70 
GDP pc 200 21962.22 5783.30 11449.00 33558.00 
Share_pop65 240 19.84 2.84 13.31 26.80 
Alignment 240 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Note: This tables provides the number of observations, mean and standard deviation of the 
main variables of the study.  
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